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There has been growth in globalization as a re- 
sult of increased liberalization. This has also 
resulted in an increase in the role of financial 
institutions, such as banks. It is the purpose of 
this study to test Classen’s (2001) hypothesis 
that increase foreign bank presence has posi- 
tive welfare implications and that the function- 
ing of national banking markets are improved 
as a result. Using financial data for 2003 this 
paper will examine the influence of foreign bank 
entry on Latin American domestic markets. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There has been growth in globalization as a result 
of increased liberalization. This has also resulted in an 
increase in the  role  of financial institutions, such  as 
banks. Internationalization of banking has occurred to 
accommodate this increased trade. Foreign banks have 
gone abroad either  by opening up a subsidiary or via 
acquisition of domestic banks.  These  activities have 
been made possible since trade liberalization has also 
been accompanied by financial market liberalization. 
The influence of foreign bank entry and its poten- 
tial benefits has been a subject of interest in the litera- 
ture Claessens, et.al. (2001), Levine (1996) Bonitsis and 
Rivera-Solis (1995), Rivera-Solis (1997) and Rivera-Solis 
(1991). In essence,  there  are two basic hypotheses: 1) 
The presence of foreign banks through increased com- 
petition and their possession of superior skills and tech- 
nology to provide a better quality of financial services 
(Levine 1996 & 1997) With regard to the first hypoth- 
esis, Claessens et al. (2001)  concluded that   foreign 
bank  entry   had  “positive welfare implications” and 
that the functioning of national banking markets were 
improved as a result of foreign bank entry. Clarke et al 
(1999), Claessens and Glaessner (1998), found similar 
results.  This  could  be called  the  Efficient  Structure 
Hypothesis. (Smirlock,  1985)  2) It is not  the  foreign 
bank’s superior efficiency but rather conditions prior 
to entry that are relevant Kumbhakar et al. (2001), and 
(Montinola and Moreno 2001. This could be referred to 
as  the  Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis 
(SCP). 
It is the purpose of this study to test Classen’s (2001) 
hypothesis that  increase foreign bank  presence has 
positive welfare implications and that the functioning 
of national banking markets are improved as a result. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used  in this study follows  the 
methodology employed by Smirlock (1985) in his study 
concentration and profitability. The empirical model 
incorporates both market share and concentration, and 
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is as follows: 
 
n = a + b  MS + b CR + b MSCR + Sb Z (1) 
between concentration and profitability, but rather be- 
tween market share  and  bank  profitability” [12] , the 
following model was constructed: 
1 2 3 i
 
 
where ï represents the profit rate, MS is the market share 
of the bank, CR is the foreign bank’s concentration ra- 
tio, MSCR is MS multiplied by CR (representing an in- 
teraction term), and Z “is a vector of additional control 
variables that  prior  studies have  found to  affect 
profitability.”(Smirlock, 1985, p.73) 
According to Smirlock  (1985) the above  model is 
very useful  in evaluating the two competing hypoth- 
eses.  If b1> 0 and b2=0, the efficient structure hypoth- 
esis is supported. If b1=0 and b2>0, the profits are not 
affected by market share but are influenced by market 
concentration, supporting the SCP hypothesis. If both 
b1  and b2 are greater than zero, then the results could be 
subject to different interpretations. The supporters of 
the SCP hypothesis would view the results as showing 
“that all firms in concentrated markets earn monopoly 
rents  from  collusion” (Smirlock,  1985, p.74) and  mo- 
nopoly rents going to the largest firms not the most effi- 
cient firms. The supporters of the E-S hypothesis would 
see the results as evidence “that leading firms are more 
efficient than  their rivals”(Smirlock, 1985, p.74) In or- 
der to interpret the findings correctly, Smirlock (1985) 
introduced MSCR as an additional regressor.  If the 
coefficient  for  MSCR is positive, then  collusion is 
present. However, if it is less than zero, then collusion 
is not extant. 
 
DATA 
Data  was  obtained for nineteen Latin  American 
countries from the Latin Banking Guide and Directory 
2003 published by Latin  Finance.  This  issue  has  in- 
come and balance sheet data for most of the banks in all 
nineteen countries. It also includes important financial 
indicators and ratios. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
At the time  of this  writing, the empirical results 
were   completed for the five Central American coun- 
tries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
and Nicaragua), the South American Countries (Argen- 
tina,  Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Para- 
guay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), and Mexico. 
Data  for this study were collected on the banking 
system of each of the countries cited.  Panama was not 
included in this study as the majority of its banks  are 
all foreign owned due to the nature of its liberal policy 
towards foreign banks. 
To test the hypothesis that “there is no relationship 
n = a + b1MSD + b2CR + b3MSCR + b3ADQCY+ b4 
QUALITY + b6FR  (2) 
 
The variables were: 
 
n= Profitability. Two different measures were used: 1) 
return on equity (ROE), and return on total assets (ROA). 
Return on equity has been suggested by Weiss [13] as 
the measure to use, while others have preferred return 
on total assets. This study will use both. 
MSD: this  variable is each bank’s total deposits divid- 
ed by the market’s total deposits. 
MS: This variable is each bank’s total assets divided by 
the banking system’s total assets. 
CR: this variable measures the four bank deposit con- 
centration ratio for all banks in the industry. 
MSCR: MSCR is MS multiplied by CR (representing an 
interaction term. 
ADQCY: Equity over assets. This variable was included 
since it measures capital  adequacy. It is possible im- 
proved capital  adequacy has a positive impact upon 
profitability. 
QUALITY: Asset quality measured by overdue loans to 
gross loans. This variable was included since improved 
asset quality has an influence bank profits. The expected 
sign of the coefficient  can be positive or negative de- 
pending on whether or not the ratio of overdue loans to 
gross loans decreases or increases. . 
FR: Multinational bank.  This dummy variable has  a 
value of one if the bank is a subsidiary or a branch of a 
foreign bank,  and  zero of it is not.  This variable was 
introduced to measure of foreign bank influence on bank 
profitability. The expected sign of the coefficient is nega- 
tive, as increased foreign bank presence is expected to 
increase competition and decrease industry bank prof- 
its. 
Regressions were run on individual countries hav- 
ing a sufficiently large banking sector to allow robust 
results, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
Due to the small  size of some  of the banking sectors 
(less than 30 banks) and the cultural and historical ties, 
regressions were run by geographical region, i.e. Mexico 
(North America), Central America, and South America. 
Tables 1 through 12 present the findings of this study. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 
 
Econometric Regression Equation: Argentina ROE 
 
ROE[t] = -1.8513992636519 MSD[t] +1510.8115696526 MSCR[t] -0.076958951684638 ADEQUACY[t] +0.12021871359215 
QUALITY[t] -4.8905116514403 FR[t] -69769.474904282 MS[t] +0.2696582460019 cr[t] -1.0754082069298E-11 + e[t] 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
MSD[t] -1.851399 2.668327 -0.693843 
MSCR[t] 1510.81157 5125.379066 0.294771 
ADEQUACY[t] -0.076959 0.061975 -1.241771 
QUALITY[t] 0.120219 0.054881 2.190531** 
FR[t] -4.890512 3.605366 -1.356454 
MS[t] -69769.474904 236689.763902 -0.294772 
cr[t] 0.269658 0.197777 1.363446 
Constant -0 8.61103 -0 
 
Multiple R 0.485381 
R-squared 0.235595 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057233 
F-TEST 1.320885 
Observations 38 
Degrees of Freedom 30 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 8.61103 
Sum Squared Errors 2224.49505 
Log Likelihood -131.243947 
Durbin-Watson 2.047237 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
TABLE 2 
Econometric Regression Equation: Argentina ROA 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Estimated Regression Equation 
 
ROA[t] = -0.30911107864535 MSD[t] -0.0094413865986214 MSCR[t] +0.037340224116665 ADEQUACY[t] 
+0.066571246913822 QUALITY[t] -1.0939763701827 FR[t] +1.2015683650123 + e[t] 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 
H0: parameter = 0 2-tail p-value 
 
 
MSD[t] 
 
-0.309111 
 
0.919075 
 
-0.336329 
 
0.738819 
MSCR[t] -0.009441 0.016469 -0.573283 0.57046 
ADEQUACY[t] 0.03734 0.021027 1.775821 0.085274 * 
QUALITY[t] 0.066571 0.019146 3.47696 0.001482 *** 
FR[t] -1.093976 1.266605 -0.863707 0.394177 
Constant 1.201568 1.009982 1.189693 0.24292 
 
Multiple R 0.593796 
R-squared 0.352594 
Adjusted R-squared 0.251436 
F-TEST 3.485597 
Observations 38 
Degrees of Freedom 32 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 3.03102 
Sum Squared Errors 293.986609 
Log Likelihood -92.792677 
Durbin-Watson 2.059168 
Von Neumann Ratio 2.114821 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
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TABLE 3 
 
 
 
Return on Equity:  Brazil 
 
Multiple  Linear  Regression  - Estimated Regression  Equation 
 
ROE[t] = +0.012352315405034 mscr[t] -9.3818898815644 F[t] -0.24232888804576 msd[t] +0.050781408295243 quality[t] - 
0.20945058915734 adequacy[t] +18.653472670358 + e[t] 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
mscr[t] 0.012352 0.051935 0.23784 
F[t] -9.38189 3.872722 -2.422557 ** 
msd[t] -0.242329 2.865973 -0.084554 
quality[t] 0.050781 0.137253 0.369983 
adequacy[t] -0.209451 0.085042 -2.462911 ** 
Constant 18.653473 3.384136 5.512033   0 
Multiple R 0.348117 
R-squared 0.121186 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085462 
F-TEST 3.392264 
Observations 129 
Degrees of Freedom 123 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 21.287389 
Sum Squared Errors 55737.808294 
Log Likelihood -574.467872 
Durbin-Watson 2.206801 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Econometric Regression  Equation: Brazil ROA 
 
Multiple  Linear  Regression  - Estimated Regression  Equation 
 
ROA[t] = +0.0027716400575682 mscr[t] -0.85990147781308 F[t] -0.19345075650233 msd[t] +0.037123962215547 quality[t]  - 
0.047742568747237 adequacy[t] +2.3861326827078 + e[t] 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 
H0: parameter = 0 2-tail p-value 
mscr[t] 0.002772 0.017515 0.158244 0.874524 
F[t] -0.859901 1.306059 -0.658394 0.511516 
msd[t] -0.193451 0.966537 -0.200148 0.841695 
quality[t] 0.037124 0.046288 0.80202 0.424088 
adequacy[t] -0.047743 0.02868 -1.664663 0.098525 * 
Constant 2.386133 1.141286 2.090741 0.03861 
 
Multiple R 0.180437 
R-squared 0.032557 
F-TEST 0.827868 
Observations 129 
Degrees of Freedom 123 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 7.179082 
Sum Squared Errors 6339.324239 
Log Likelihood -434.252192 
Durbin-Watson 2.479818 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
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TABLE 5 
 
 
 
Econometric Regression Equation: Mexico ROE Multiple 
Linear Regression - Estimated Regression Equation 
ROE(%)[t] = -1.6231289773858 fr[t] -0.022743041503457 mscr[t] +0.090320820030729 quality[t] +0.037670332711596 
adequacy[t] +1.6573256824251 msd[t] +3.021984594962 + e[t] 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 
H0: parameter = 0 2-tail p-value 
 
fr[t] -1.623129 2.433224 -0.667069 0.511091 
mscr[t] -0.022743 0.020784 -1.09424 0.284711 
quality[t] 0.090321 0.182201 0.49572 0.624601 
adequacy[t] 0.03767 0.070957 0.530891 0.600373 
msd[t] 1.657326 1.440843 1.150247 0.261375 
Constant 3.021985 2.229379 1.355528 0.18787 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.329133 
R-squared 0.108329 
F-TEST 0.58315 
Observations 30 
Degrees of Freedom 24 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 6.268453 
Sum Squared Errors 943.04393 
Log Likelihood -94.286888 
Durbin-Watson 2.261331 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Econometric Regression Equation: Mexico ROA 
 
ROA(%)[t] = -0.03895162635887 fr[t] -0.0015733171104558 mscr[t] +0.085950403930817 quality[t] +0.050290670008084 
adequacy[t] +0.11145554874401 msd[t] -0.41578067670018 + e[t] 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 1-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
fr[t] -0.038952 0.377675 -0.103135 0.918713 
mscr[t] -0.001573 0.003226 -0.48769 0.630195 
 
quality[t] 0.08595 0.028281 3.039207 0.005653 *** 
adequacy[t] 0.050291 0.011014 4.566225 0.000125 *** 
msd[t] 0.111456 0.223642 0.498367 0.622762 
 Constant -0.415781 0.346035 -1.201557 0.241258 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.846497 
R-squared 0.716557 
Adjusted R-squared 0.657507 
F-TEST 12.134629 
Observations 30 
Degrees of Freedom 24 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 0.972963 
Sum Squared Errors 22.719769 
Log Likelihood -38.398727 
Durbin-Watson 1.941477 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
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TABLE 7 
 
 
 
Econometric Regression  Equation Venezuela  ROE 
 
ROE(%)[t] = -1.6363658532505 fb[t] -0.076227094943016 mscr[t] +4.5236553542856 ms[t] -0.1483279916532 adequacy[t] - 
0.17838247076507 quality[t] +21.914437889692 + e[t] 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
fb[t] -1.636366 5.877949 -0.278391 0.782399 
mscr[t] -0.076227 0.134788 -0.565534 0.575424 
ms[t] 4.523655 7.640219 0.592085 0.557711 
adequacy[t] -0.148328 0.073845 -2.00864 0.052571   ** 
quality[t] -0.178382 0.119855 -1.488323 0.145883 
Constant 21.914438 2.909495 7.532042 0 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.529954 
R-squared 0.280851 
Adjusted R-squared 0.175094 
F-TEST 2.655621 
Observations 40 
Degrees of Freedom 34 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 9.664245 
Sum Squared Errors 3175.519386 
Log Likelihood -144.244482 
Durbin-Watson 2.120138 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Eonometric Regression  Equation Venezuela  ROA 
 
ROA(%)[t] = -0.046864878919551 fb[t] -0.0043036617743585 mscr[t] +0.2422758082146 ms[t] +0.027881541261952 adequacy[t] 
-0.049413911556652 quality[t] +2.8177118237717 + e[t] 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
fb[t] -0.046865 1.111505 -0.042163 0.966615 
mscr[t] -0.004304 0.025488 -0.16885 0.866915 
ms[t] 0.242276 1.444745 0.167694 0.867817 
 
adequacy[t] 0.027882 0.013964 1.996688 0.053916 ** 
quality[t] -0.049414 0.022664 -2.180262 0.036255 ** 
Constant 2.817712 0.550178 5.121456 1.2E-05 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.406043 
R-squared 0.164871 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042058 
F-TEST 1.342454 
Observations 40 
Degrees of Freedom 34 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 1.827483 
Sum Squared Errors 113.549643 
Log Likelihood -77.624755 
Durbin-Watson 2.506149 
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* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Econometric Regression Equation: Central America  ROE 
 
ROE[t] = -1.9085445354637 fb[t] +0.0088460075862965 mscr[t] -0.45557097544923 [t] -0.18222169622886 ms[t] - 
0.55711294982498 adequacy[t] -0.069405441066807 quality[t] +21.51307694065 + e[t] 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
fb[t] -1.908545 3.364685 -0.567228 0.572323 
mscr[t] 0.008846 0.008137 1.087167 0.280589 
[t] -0.455571 0.604572 -0.753543 0.453581 
ms[t] -0.182222 0.177039 -1.029275 0.306796 
adequacy[t] -0.557113 0.260108 -2.141856 0.035589 ** 
quality[t] -0.069405 0.054345 -1.27712 0.205663 
Constant 21.513077 4.95043 4.345699 4.5E-05 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.398666 
R-squared 0.158934 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088845 
F-TEST 2.267612 
Observations 79 
Degrees of Freedom 72 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 10.121476 
Sum Squared Errors 7375.988102 
Log Likelihood -291.289367 
Durbin-Watson 2.090254 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 10 
Econometric Regression  Equation: Central America  ROA 
 
ROA[t] = -0.030501484278068 fb[t] +0.00058367971630013 mscr[t] -0.024072165061212 [t] +0.098270346834668 ms[t] - 
0.070573986716409 adequacy[t] -0.0056619273353024 quality[t] +0.81016233222098 + e[t] 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
fb[t] -0.030501 0.302599 -0.100798 0.919991 
mscr[t] 0.000584 0.000732 0.797627 0.42771 
[t] -0.024072 0.054372 -0.442734 0.659285 
 
ms[t] 0.09827 0.015922 6.172062 0 *** 
adequacy[t] -0.070574 0.023393 -3.016949 0.003528 *** 
quality[t] -0.005662 0.004887 -1.158454 0.250507 
 Constant 0.810162 0.445212 1.819724 0.072958 
 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.623987 
R-squared 0.38936 
Adjusted R-squared 0.338473 
F-TEST 7.651502 
Observations 79 
Degrees of Freedom 72 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
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Standard Error 0.910264 
Sum Squared Errors 59.657862 
Log Likelihood -101.003679 
Durbin-Watson 2.387851 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 11 
Econometric Regression Equation: Latin America ROE 
 
ROE[t] = -8.2346542241138 FR[t] -0.14607699147828 MSD[t] +1.0346450134483E-05 MSCR[t] -0.16177006324311 
ADEQUACY[t] +0.037721991091462 QUALITY[t] +17.765463959592 + e[t] 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
 
FR[t] -8.234654 1.797618 -4.580869  7E-06   *** 
MSD[t] -0.146077 0.391384 -0.373232 0.709232 
MSCR[t] 1E-05 0.006114 0.001692 0.998651 
ADEQUACY[t] -0.16177 0.040862 -3.958919 9.4E-05  *** 
QUALITY[t] 0.037722 0.057777 0.652891 0.514314 
Constant 17.765464 1.582222 11.228173 0 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.335076 
R-squared 0.112276 
Adjusted R-squared 0.097865 
F-TEST 7.790928 
Observations 314 
Degrees of Freedom 308 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 15.425317 
Sum Squared Errors 73285.649278 
Log Likelihood -1301.624854 
Durbin-Watson 2.093857 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 12 
Econometric Regression Equation Latin America ROA 
 
ROA[t] = -0.024519500779628 MSD[t] -0.00022515333279731 MSCR[t] +0.00018289763846875 ADEQUACY[t] 
+0.041511747689393 QUALITY[t] -1.1979077497465 FR[t] +1.8587540635818 + e[t] 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Variable Parameter S.E. T-STAT 2-tail p-value 
H0: parameter = 0 
MSD[t] -0.02452 0.126266 -0.194189 0.846156 
MSCR[t] -0.000225 0.001973 -0.11414 0.909201 
ADEQUACY[t] 0.000183 0.013183 0.013874 0.988939 
 
QUALITY[t] 0.041512 0.01864 2.227068 0.026665 ** 
FR[t] -1.197908 0.579937 -2.065582 0.039704 ** 
Constant 1.858754 0.510447 3.641423 0.000318 
 
 
Multiple Linear Regression - Regression Statistics 
 
Multiple R 0.182288 
R-squared 0.033229 
Adjusted R-squared 0.017535 
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F-TEST 2.11725 
Observations 314 
Degrees of Freedom 308 
Multiple Linear Regression - Residual Statistics 
Standard Error 4.976425 
Sum Squared Errors 7627.560003 
Log Likelihood -946.397156 
Durbin-Watson 2.328666 
 
* significant at the 10 percent level 
** significant at the 5 percent level 
*** significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
 
Tables 1 through 12 for equations ROE and ROA pro- 
vide some interesting results. The sign for the variable 
MSCR is positive in about half of the cases, but in no 
case is it statistically significant. It appears that  once 
market share  is taken  into consideration; market con- 
centration continues to be statistically insignificant. FR 
for Mexico and El Salvador had the expected sign since 
increased competition affects  profit  margins On  the 
other hand, FR was statistically significant for ROE for 
Argentina, Brazil, and Latin America. The signs of the 
coefficients were negative indicating that foreign bank 
presence had a negative impact on return on equity. In 
all other  instances FR  was  statistically insignificant 
for both ROE and ROA. Adequacy was statistically sig- 
nificant for most  of the equations for ROE and  ROA. 
Quality was statistically significant for ROA   for Ar- 
gentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and Latin America. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
These findings do not appear to support the S-C-P 
hypothesis. Once market share was taken into account, 
concentration continued to be statistically insignificant, 
but MSD was also statistically insignificant. It also ap- 
pears  that capital  adequacy and asset quality in play 
an important influence on both  ROE and  ROA. As a 
result, the E-S hypothesis does appear to be supported. 
These findings tend to support Smirlock’s  ( 1985) con- 
tention that concentration in banking markets do not 
lead to monopoly profits, and that the relationship be- 
tween concentration and  profitability as indicated in 
previous studies is spurious. Furthermore, the presence 
of concentration is a result of the “superior efficiency of 
the  leading firms”  rather than  a result of collusion. 
Furthermore, the empirical results do not appear to sup- 
port  Classen’s (2001) hypothesis that  an increase for- 
eign bank  presence has positive welfare implications 
and  that the functioning of national banking markets 
are improved as a result. 
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